A Quantum Information Theoretical Model for Quantum Secret Sharing
  Schemes by Imai, Hideki et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
03
11
13
6v
1 
 2
0 
N
ov
 2
00
3
A Quantum Information Theoretical Model for
Quantum Secret Sharing Schemes
Hideki Imai† Jo¨rn Mu¨ller–Quade∗
Anderson C. A. Nascimento† Pim Tuyls‡ Andreas Winter§
14 October 2003
Abstract
In this paper we introduce a quantum information theoretical model
for quantum secret sharing schemes. We show that quantum information
theory provides a unifying framework for the study of these schemes. We
prove that the information theoretical requirements for a class of quantum
secret sharing schemes reduce to only one requirement (the recoverability
condition) as a consequence of the no-cloning principle. We give also a
shorter proof of the fact that the size of the shares in a quantum secret
sharing scheme must be at least as large as the secret itself.
1 Introduction
Quantum secret sharing has been an active area of research in quantum infor-
mation theory [1][2][3][4]. In a quantum secret sharing protocol, a dealer shares
an unknown quantum state with a set of players such that authorized subgroups
of players can recover the quantum state, but unauthorized subgroups cannot
get any information on it. Quantum secret sharing was first introduced in [2],
where Hillery et al. proposed a scheme to share a single qubit between two play-
ers. In [1] Cleve, Gottesman and Lo presented a more general scheme where
a dealer can share an unknown quantum state with a set of players in a way
that only groups with more than a given number of players, t, can recover the
original secret and collusions of players with less than t players have no infor-
mation about it. Given that the total number of players is n, this is a quantum
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(t, n)-threshold scheme. The construction in [1] was based on quantum error
correcting codes. Constructions for general access structures were presented in
[4] by Gottesman and in [5] by Smith.
In classical secret sharing, and in classical cryptography in general, informa-
tion theory has played a major role when designing and evaluating cryptographic
primitives and protocols [6][7][8][9]. It is a natural question to investigate the
properties of their quantum mechanical counterparts. In this contribution, we
introduce a quantum information theoretical model for quantum secret sharing
schemes. We show that quantum information theory provides a unifying frame-
work for the study of these schemes. Additionally, we prove that the information
theoretical requirements for some quantum secret sharing schemes differ from
the ones for their classical counterparts. Moreover, we give a shorter proof of
the fact that the size of the shares in a quantum secret sharing scheme must be
at least as large as the secret itself. This result was first stated in [4].
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we review some important
concepts of quantum information theory that are used in this paper. Section
3 introduces our model for quantum secret sharing schemes. We show that
the recoverability requirement for pure state quantum secret sharing protocols
implies the secrecy one in Section 4. In Section 5, we present a new and shorter
proof of the fact that the sizes of the shares of a quantum secret sharing scheme
are at least as large as the size of the quantum secret being shared. Finally, we
conclude in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Quantum Information Theory
We briefly review some important concepts of quantum information theory that
will be used through the paper. For a nice introduction to the subject we suggest
the references [10] and [11]. We consider finite dimensional quantum systems
with m degrees of freedom which are modeled by the algebra of m×m matrices
over the complex numbers, here denoted by Mm. The state of a system X is
described by its density matrix ρX ∈Mm.
The quantum entropy of a quantum system X with a density matrix ρX ∈
Mm is defined as in [11]
S(X) = −Tr(ρX log ρX) = −
∑
1≤j≤m
λj logλj ,
where λ1, . . . , λm are the eigenvalues of ρX . The quantum entropy can be in-
terpreted as the average number of qubits necessary to describe a realization of
the system X [12].
Quantum entropies generalize the classical Shannon entropies. For a random
variable A taking values in an alphabet A = {a1, . . . , an} one has
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H(A) = −
∑
a∈A
p(a) log p(a),
where the random variable A takes the value x with probability p(x). When
all the quantum states that compose the quantum mixture ρX are orthogonal,
S(X) reduces to H(X).
Conditional entropy is a very important tool used to analyze classical sys-
tems. For two random variables A and B taking values in the alphabets A and
B respectively, the conditional entropy is defined as:
H(A|B) =
∑
a∈A,b∈B
p(a, b) log p(a|b).
In order to analyze quantum secret sharing schemes precisely, it is important to
generalize classical conditional entropies to the quantum domain.
Let XY be a bipartite quantum system represented by a density matrix
ρXY living on the Hilbert space HXY = HX ⊗ HY . The subsystems X and
Y will be represented by the partial traces ρX = TrY ρXY and ρY = TrXρXY .
The quantum entropy of a quantum system X conditional on another quantum
system Y can be defined as (see [11]):
S(X |Y ) = S(XY )− S(Y ), (1)
where S(XY ) = −Tr(ρXY log ρXY ) and S(Y ) = −Tr(ρY log ρY ).
One can understand the quantum conditional entropy as the ignorance about
the quantum system X when having full knowledge of Y.
It is important to stress that it is possible to define different versions of
quantum conditional probabilities. However, a nice point about the definition
used here is that several well known properties of classical conditional entropies
are valid in the new scenario [13][14][15][16].
In spite of these similarities in the formulae, quantum conditional entropies
are qualitatively different from their classical counterparts. For example, quan-
tum conditional entropies can be negative while classical conditional entropies
are always non-negative. It means that in quantum systems, sometimes, the
entropy of the entire quantum system can be smaller than the entropy of one
of its subsystems. This is the case for the so called entangled systems. Another
consequence of the negativity of quantum conditional entropies is that proofs
from classical information theory do not usually straightforwardly apply to the
quantum scenario, since they often rely on the non-negativity of conditional
entropies.
Similarly, a quantum counterpart of the classical mutual information is de-
fined (see [11]) as follows:
I(X : Y ) = S(X) + S(Y )− S(XY ) ≥ 0.
It should be remarked that the quantum information does not only measure
quantum correlations between two systems. It includes both quantum and clas-
sical correlations [13].
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The quantum mutual information can be interpreted as the information on
the quantum state X that is conveyed by Y . Indeed, it is 0 iff the state of XY
is a product: ρXY = ρX ⊗ ρY .
The subadditivity, strong subadditivity and the Araki-Lieb inequalities of
quantum entropies will be heavily used when deriving our results. For the
convenience of the reader we state these results here [11].
The subadditivity of quantum entropies tells us that for a composite quan-
tum system XY , the following inequality holds:
S(XY ) ≤ S(X) + S(Y ).
The Araki-Lieb inequality is stated as:
S(XY ) ≥ |S(X)− S(Y )|
where | · | denotes the absolute value.
Finally, the strong subadditivity states that for any composite quantum
system XY Z, the following inequality holds:
S(XY Z) + S(Y ) ≤ S(XY ) + S(Y Z).
It is easy to show that the following inequality is a consequence of the strong
subadditivity of quantum entropies:
I(X : Y ) ≤ I(X : Y Z)
for any tripartite system XY Z.
2.2 Classical Secret Sharing Schemes
As stated in Section 1, a secret sharing scheme is a protocol that enables a
dealer D to share a secret Si from a set of n possible secrets Ω = {S1, . . . , Sn}
with a set of players P so that the members of an authorized group are able
to recover Si, but no other members can get any information about the secret
Si. The authorized groups will be defined by an access structure Γ ⊂ 2P , a
family where each element is an authorized group. More precisely, for a set of
participants P = {P1, . . . , Pm} and a dealer D, the access structure Γ ⊂ 2P is
a family of subsets of P containing the sets of participants qualified to recover
the secret. Monotonicity is a natural requirement of an access structure, i.e.
if X ∈ Γ and X ⊂ X ′ then X ′ ∈ Γ. There is one operation Λ which chooses
randomly with a given distribution a tuple of shares ∈ Ω1×· · ·×Ωm for a given
secret ∈ Ω. By Λj : Ω→ Ωj we denote the restriction of the operation Λ to one
player Pj determining its share. To obtain consistent shares all Λj , j ∈ P refer
to the same execution of the operation Λ. Assuming a probability distribution
on Ω, the secret S and the shares Λj become random variables. A secret sharing
scheme is called perfect if:
1. Any set of qualified participants X ∈ Γ can uniquely determine the secret
S, i.e. H(S|Λj : j ∈ X) = 0 .
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2. None of the subsets X ⊂ P , X /∈ Γ can get information about the secret
S, i.e. H(S|Λj : j ∈ X) = H(S).
When |P| = m and Γ = {B ⊆ P : |B| ≥ t} the secret sharing scheme is
called a (t,m)−threshold scheme.
3 A Model for Quantum Secret Sharing Schemes
In this Section, we provide a formal definition of a secret sharing scheme based
on quantum entropies. In a quantum secret sharing protocol, a dealer D wants
to share a quantum state |X〉 with a set of players P according to a given access
structure Γ ⊂ 2P . The access structure Γ is a family that lists all the subsets
of players that can recover the quantum secret |X〉.
In our model, the quantum secret |X〉 is chosen from a set of possible quan-
tum secrets X = { |X1〉, |X2〉, . . . , |Xn〉}. The a priori probability that the
secret |Xi〉 is chosen is pi. The quantum secret S can thus be represented by
the quantum mixture:
ρS = p1|X1〉〈X1|+ p2|X2〉〈X2|+ . . .+ pn|Xn〉〈Xn|.
We assume the states |Xi〉 to be pure states. The set of possible quantum shares
given to a player P ∈ P and any quantum state that he may possess are, for
simplicity of notation, also denoted by P . Its density matrix is represented by
ρP .
Each quantum secret is assumed to lie in a n-dimensional Hilbert space HS .
We will model the shares of the players by quantum systems. The Hilbert space
in which the share of player i lives is denoted by Hi. If A is a subset of P ,
then we will denote the Hilbert space that describes the shares of players in A
by HA = ⊗a∈AHa. Let us introduce a reference system R with Hilbert space
HR and a purification, denoted |SR〉 ∈ HS ⊗HR: i.e., after tracing out R, one
recovers ρS [11]. A distribution of shares is given by a completely positive map
ΛD : S(HS)→ S(H1 ⊗ . . .⊗Hm) (2)
where S(HA) represents the state space of the system A. Note that by the
Stinespring dilation theorem we can always make ΛD an isometry (as we shall
henceforth assume to be the case), by adding a player Pm+1 [11] (and trivially
extending the access structure). We denote by |RP1...Pm〉 the state of the
quantum system RP1...Pm after applying ΛD to S (and the identity to R). We
denote by A, both a given subset of players A = {P1, . . . , Pj} ⊆ P and the
quantum shares which are in the possession of those respective players. The set
of all the quantum shares which are distributed to the players in P is denoted
by Y .
Definition 1 Let R be a reference system such that SR is in a pure state. A
quantum secret sharing protocol realizing an access structure Γ is a complete
positive map which generates quantum shares {P1, . . . , Pm} from a quantum
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secret ρS = p1|X1〉〈X1|+ p2|X2〉〈X2|+ . . .+ pn|Xn〉〈Xn|, and distributes these
shares among a set of players P, | P | = m such that:
1. For all A ∈ Γ we have that I(R : A) = I(R : S), or equivalently, as proved
in [17], for A ∈ Γ there exists a completely positive map TA : HA → HS
such that
idR ⊗ TA :S(HR ⊗HA)→ S(R⊗HS)
ρRA 7→ |RS〉
(3)
2. For all A /∈ Γ we have that I(R : A) = 0.
The requirement 1 means that the entanglement between the reference state
and the secret is preserved when it is recovered by authorized players (recover-
ability requirement). Actually, we remark that the equality I(R : A) = I(R : S)
is equivalent to saying that the coherent information Ie = S(A)− S(RA) equals
the entropy of the secret S(S). In [17], it was proven that this condition is
necessary and sufficient for quantum error correction. In our case, this means
that an authorized group can reconstruct the secret exactly. Consequently, our
requirement 1 implies a relation between quantum error correcting codes and
quantum secret sharing schemes. More in particular, this means that one can
see the mapping ΛD followed by restricting to the systems A as a quantum noisy
channel and the recovery process as quantum error correction.
The requirement 2 means that unauthorized groups cannot recover any state
which is correlated to R, and consequently with S (secrecy requirement). Note
that monotonicity is also naturally embedded in this definition. We remind the
reader that the second requirement means that the state of the system AR is
a product state, hence A and R are independent. Consequently, the relative
entropy S(S|A) is equal to S(S).
In the next Section we prove that, in contrast to classical schemes, the
recoverability requirement implies the secrecy requirement in some quantum
secret sharing schemes.
Example 2 We briefly illustrate our definition for the case of the (2, 3) thresh-
old secret sharing scheme mentioned in [1]. For sake of clarity, we repeat the
scheme here. The secret is an arbitrary three dimensional quantum state, i.e.
ρS = 1/3
∑2
i=0 |i〉〈i|. The encoding scheme that encodes the shares for the dif-
ferent players is given by an isometry US : C
3 → C3 ⊗ C3 ⊗ C3 mapping
US : α|0〉+ β|1〉+ γ|2〉 7→ α(|000〉+ |111〉+ |222〉)
+ β(|012〉+ |120〉+ |201〉)
+ γ(|021〉+ |102〉+ |210〉)
We note that the operator US induces a completely positive map ΛD on M3. As
S is a completely mixed state, its purification on C3 ⊗ C3 (entanglement with
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the reference system) looks as follows |RS〉 = 1/√3∑2i=0 |i〉 ⊗ |i〉. The system
RA (for A = P) can then be described as follows,
|RA〉 = (1⊗ US)|RS〉
=
1
3
(|0000〉+ |0111〉+ |0222〉+ |1012〉+ |1120〉
+ |1201〉+ |2021〉+ |2102〉+ |2210〉)
It follows immediately that I(R : S) = 2 log 3. When we take A = 1, 2, i.e. A
is an authorized set, it readily follows from the previous equation that S(A) =
2 log 3 and S(RA) = log 3. Hence, as I(R : A) = 2 log 3, the recoverability
requirement is satisfied. If on the other hand A = 1, i.e A is not authorized,
then it follows that the system RA is in the product state 131 ⊗ 131. Hence the
secrecy condition is satisfied.
We note that the quantum entropy of the mixed state ρS can be understood
as the minimum number of qubits necessary to faithfully store the quantum
secret (see [12]). The same applies for the quantum mixtures representing the
quantum shares of the players.
A fundamental issue when dealing with secret sharing schemes is the amount
of data that must be given to the set of players. The smaller the amount of data
given to the set of players the better. This issue becomes even more important
when dealing with quantum secret sharing. As quantum data is expensive and
hard to deal with, it would be desirable to use as little quantum data as possible
in order to share an unknown quantum state. Therefore, the analysis of the size
of shares in quantum secret sharing schemes is an important research subject
[18]. Based on the model introduced earlier and on classical equivalents [8], we
define two important quantities related to the size of the shares in a quantum
secret sharing scheme.
Definition 3 The quantum information rate of a secret sharing scheme which
shares a quantum secret state S with a set of players P realizing an access
structure Γ is given by the following expression: r = S(S)maxX∈P S(X) .
The average quantum information rate of a secret sharing scheme which
shares a quantum secret state S with a set of players P realizing an access
structure Γ is given by the following expression: r¯ = S(S)|P|∑
X∈P
S(X) .
We shall demonstrate how quantum information theoretical tools can be
used to prove lower bounds on the size of the quantum shares in a quantum
secret sharing scheme.
4 Relation between the Recoverability and Se-
crecy Requirement
In this section, we prove that the recoverability requirement as stated in the
last section, implies the secrecy requirement for some quantum secret sharing
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schemes. This result means that, for some access structures, if an authorized set
of players is able to recover a quantum secret at all, the unauthorized players
have no information about the secret. This is a consequence of the no-cloning
theorem and stands in sharp contrast with classical secret sharing schemes.
We first introduce the notion of coexistence. We say that a set of shares
A coexists with a secret S if there exists a completely positive map T from
A′ = P \ A to the system S such that the secret S can be recovered. More
precisely, this is given by a completely positive map T such that
idR ⊗ T : |RA′〉 7−→ |RS〉. (4)
In the following proposition (which was first observed by Gottesman [4]), we
prove that if a quantum state A can coexist with the quantum secret S, then A
should have no correlation with S, that is A cannot be used to recover S.
Proposition 4 Given a quantum secret ρS = p1|X1〉〈X1|+ p2|X2〉〈X2|+ . . .+
pn|Xn〉〈Xn| and a reference system R such that RS is in a pure state. If A can
coexist with the quantum secret S, then I(R : A) = 0, i.e. RA is in a product
state.
Proof. From the strong subadditivity property of quantum entropies, it follows
that
I(A : R) ≤ I(A : SR).
On the other hand we have
I(A : SR) = S(A) + S(SR)− S(SRA)
≤ S(A) + S(RS)− S(A) + S(RS).
The last inequality follows from the Araki-Lieb inequality. Since RS is in a pure
state it follows that: S(RS) = 0, and hence that I(A : R) ≤ 0. Since the mutual
quantum information is non-negative the proposition follows.

Theorem 5 For quantum secret sharing schemes where unauthorized sets of
players are the complement of authorized sets the recoverability requirement im-
plies the secrecy requirement.
Proof. In quantum secret sharing schemes where unauthorized sets of players
are the complement of authorized sets, all the quantum states in possession of
unauthorized sets of players coexist with the secret, since it can be recovered
by the authorized players. Therefore, from Proposition 4, we know that there is
no correlation between the quantum states of unauthorized sets of players and
the secret.

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5 A Lower Bound on the Size of the Shares
In this section we give a proof that the size of the shares in a quantum secret
sharing scheme must be as large as the size of the secret itself. This theorem
was first proved in [4]. However, our proof is based on quantum entropies and
it is simpler than the original one: it follows from the subadditivity property of
quantum entropies [10][11].
Theorem 6 In any quantum secret sharing scheme realizing an access structure
Γ for any subsets of players A and B such that A,B /∈ Γ but A∪B ∈ Γ it holds
that S(A) ≥ S(S) where S is the secret being shared.
Proof. From the fact that A ∪B ∈ Γ and Def. 1 we have that
S(AB) − S(RAB) = S(R).
Applying the Araki-Lieb inequality to S(RAB), we get
S(AB) − S(RA) + S(B) ≥ S(R).
Since I(A : R) = 0, it follows that S(RA) = S(A)+S(R), and this together with
the last inequality gives us:
S(AB) − S(A) + S(B) ≥ 2S(R).
Using the subadditivity property and the fact that S(R) = S(S), it follows that
S(B) ≥ S(S)
which proves the theorem.

From Definition 3 and Theorem 6, Corollary 7 follows:
Corollary 7 The quantum information rate and the average quantum informa-
tion rate of a secret sharing scheme are lower bounded by 1.

Another concept closely related to quantum secret sharing is the quantum
Vernam cipher, introduced by Leung in [19]. In a quantum Vernam cipher, a
sender, Alice, wants to send a quantum state to a recipient, Bob, such that an
eavesdropper, Eve, when intercepting this secret quantum state has no way to
get any knowledge on it. To perform so, they share in advance entangled states
and use it as a quantum key. So, in a quantum Vernam cipher, the key and
the message are quantum states. Actually, the quantum Vernam cipher is an
implementation of a quantum secret sharing scheme. If Alice’s part of the key
is represented by the quantum system A, Bob’s by the quantum system B, the
encrypted message is represented by the quantum system M , and the quantum
cleartext resides in the secret system S, the quantum Vernam cipher can be
described by the following access structure Γ = {(A,M), (B,M)}. Therefore,
the following corollary holds.
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Corollary 8 In a quantum Vernam cipher the size of the key is as large as the
size of the message to be transmitted.

We remark that although the dimension of the quantum keys in a quantum
Vernam cipher is as large as the dimension of the quantummessage, the quantum
scheme presents an advantage over its classical counterpart: the quantum keys
can be recycled [19].
6 Conclusions
We introduced a quantum information theoretical model for quantum secret
sharing schemes. This model provided new insights into the theory of quantum
secret sharing. We proved that the recoverability requirement implies the se-
crecy requirement for a class of quantum secret sharing schemes by giving an
information theoretical argument for Gottesman’s result that the complement of
an authorized set is unauthorized. Also, we gave a shorter proof of his theorem
that the size of the shares in a quantum secret sharing scheme must be as large
as the secret itself. Additionally, we proved that the size of a key in a quantum
Vernam cipher must be as large as the message itself.
It is an interesting open problem to prove better lower bounds on the infor-
mation rate for specific access structures different from threshold schemes.
After this work was concluded, we were informed that the lower bound on
the size of shares of quantum secret sharing schemes has been proved in [20] by
using different methods.
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